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A Golden Opportunity Dismissed: The New
Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests Case
Stephen M. Tokarz*
INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 1995, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) en-
tered an order dismissing New Zealand's claims in the dispute between
New Zealand and France over nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 1
This order was prompted by a request from New Zealand for an exami-
nation of the nuclear testing situation in accord with a special provision
contained in a previous 1974 judgment of the ICJ2 The original dispute
between the two countries arose out of France's proposed atmospheric
nuclear tests in the South Pacific and New Zealand's objection to those
tests. After New Zealand received an interim order from the ICJ asking
France to refrain from nuclear testing until the Court considered New
Zealand's substantive claims,3 France announced that it would halt all
plans for atmospheric nuclear testing. The Court found that this action
rendered the dispute between the parties moot, 4 and consequently dis-
missed New Zealand's claims against France in its judgment of Decem-
ber 20, 1974.5 Since the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,
the Court never reached New Zealand's substantive international law
claims. However, in an unprecedented move, the Court included within
its decision a special provision in paragraph 63 of its 1974 judgment
that "if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, [New Zealand]
could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the
provisions of the [ICJ] Statute."6
France announced in 1995 that it would conduct a series of eight
underground nuclear weapons tests in the territory of French Polyne-
" J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law, 1999.
1. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995
I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
2. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
3. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order of June
22).
4. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1 limits the Court's jurisdiction to "[s]uch
disputes as are submitted to it..." (emphasis added).
5. See 1974 I.C.J. 457.
6. Id. at 477.
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sia.7 New Zealand used the paragraph 63 special provision to again
protest France's proposed nuclear weapons tests. However, the Court
found that the "basis" of the 1974 judgment had not been affected (as
the language in paragraph 63 required) because that judgment was
based solely on France's promise not to conduct any further atmospheric
nuclear tests and the present situation involved underground nuclear
tests.8 Therefore, the Court again dismissed New Zealand's claims
against France without reaching any of New Zealand's compelling sub-
stantive international law claims.
Part One of this article introduces the case by examining the back-
ground of the dispute. Part Two examines the Court's judgment and
reasoning in the 1995 New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests case. Part
Three considers the decision of the Court and argues that by prema-
turily dismissing New Zealand's claims, the Court missed an opporunity
to advance the development of international law.
PART ONE
The dispute between New Zealand and France that led to the
Court's 1995 judgment originated with New Zealand's objection to
France's proposal in 1973 to conduct a series of atmospheric nuclear
tests in the South Pacific. France proposed atmospheric nuclear testing
at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls, 600 miles from Tahiti and 2,500
miles from New Zealand.9 Both Australia and New Zealand filed Appli-
cations in the ICJ claiming breach of legal norms in the testing of at-
mospheric nuclear weapons, unlawful action by allowing radioactive
fallout to cause atmospheric and marine pollution in their territories,
and interference with maritime and air navigation.10 The Court's juris-
diction was originally invoked on two bases: (1) Articles 36(1) and 37 of
the Statute of the Court and Article 17 of the General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes [hereinafter "General Act"], to
which New Zealand and France both had acceded; (2) Articles 36(2) and
36(5) of the Statute of the Court. New Zealand received an interim pro-
tection order from the Court on June 22, 1973, which stated that the
French government should avoid conducting any nuclear tests in the
region until the Court had rendered a decision in the case.11
While the case was pending before the Court, France announced
7. See Craig R. Whitney, France Planning Nuclear Tests Despite Opposition, Chirac
Says, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at A3, available in 1995 WL 2180971.
8. See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 306.
9. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests: The Dismissed
Case of Lasting Significance, 37 VA. J. INT'L. L. 107, 111 (1996).
10. Id. at 112.
11. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 142 (Interim Protection Order of June
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that it did not plan to proceed with any atmospheric nuclear testing in
the South Pacific. The Court thereafter dismissed New Zealand's case
without reaching any of the substantive claims. 12 In deciding to dismiss
the case, the Court noted that it is called upon "to resolve existing dis-
putes between States"'13 and that the "circumstances that have since
arisen render any adjudication devoid of purpose."14 The Court further
explained that "it does not enter into the adjudicatory functions of the
Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it has reached the conclu-
sion that the merits of the case no longer fall to be determined." 5 How-
ever, the Court did leave the door slightly open for New Zealand to re-
turn to it in the future when it added paragraph 63 to its judgment.
The court noted in paragraph 63 that it was not its function to specu-
late on whether France would keep its word, but that "if the basis of
this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an ex-
amination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute."' 6 The precise meaning of this paragraph became the focal
point for New Zealand's claims some twenty-one years later.
On June 13, 1995, France announced that it would conduct a series
of eight underground nuclear tests in the territory of French Polynesia
in the South Pacific. 17 The announcement by French President Jacques
Chirac signaled an end to a voluntary three year moratorium on under-
ground nuclear tests.' 8 The decision touched off a worldwide firestorm
of controversy and opposition. Besides internal protests by the French
population,' 9 lawmakers from around the world gathered in Tahiti (just
600 miles from the proposed tests) to protest the French decision. 20
Consumer boycotts of French goods and services were called for in New
Zealand and Australia.21 Greenpeace dispatched a ship to protest the
French decision to resume testing which was boarded by French com-
mandos on July 9, 1995.22 Undeterred, Greenpeace later announced it
would send a flotilla of up to 30 boats to the area in a coordinated effort
12. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 456, 478 (Dec. 20).
13. Id. at 476.
14. Id. at 477 quoting Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 38
(Dec. 2).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Whitney, supra note 7.
18. See Thousands Gather in Tahiti to Protest France's Planned Nuclear Tests,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 1995, at 23A, available in 1995 WL 9057718 [hereinafter
Thousands Gather in Tahiti].
19. See 3,000 in France Protest Nuclear Tests, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 1995, at
A7, available in 1995 WL 2827420.
20. See Thousands Gather in Tahiti, supra note 18.
21. See Michael Richardson, Consumers Plan Boycotts Over French Tests, INT'L.
HERALD TRIB., June 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7546538.
22. See Craig R. Whitney, Paris Defends Seizing Ship in Atom Test Zone, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1995, at A12, available in 1995 WL 2194745.
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to stop the nuclear tests. 23
On August 8, 1995, Prime Minister Bolger of New Zealand an-
nounced that he would attempt to stop the French nuclear tests by re-
turning to the ICJ and resuming the New Zealand v. France Nuclear
Tests case. 24 On August 21, 1995, New Zealand again instituted pro-
ceedings against France in the ICJ, basing the Court's jurisdiction on
the Court's Judgment of 1974. France's subsequent nuclear test on
September 5, 1995, increased the world's interest in the proceedings
now underway at the Hague.25 Shortly thereafter, the European Par-
liament reaffirmed its opposition to all nuclear tests and called on
France to cancel the remaining planned tests.26
PART TWO
The jurisdiction of the ICJ in contentious cases is based on the con-
sent of the parties. 27 The required consent, under Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the Court, may be either express or implied. 28 A State may
also recognize compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2)29 for legal
disputes when another State has made a similar declaration.30
Since France had denounced the General Act and withdrawn from
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1974, New Zealand had no
jurisdictional basis based on consent on which to bring a new case
against France. 31 New Zealand's only option was to attempt to reopen
23. See Keith Miller, Profile: Protests Against France's Nuclear Tests, NBC NIGHTLY
NEWS, Aug. 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10122216.
24. See Michael Munro, Bolger Seeks to Outlaw Atoll Nuclear Tests, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Aug. 9,1995, available in 1995 WL 7689486.
25. See William Drozdiak, In Angry Words and Marches, World Condemns French
Test, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File; Test
and Shout, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 9570473.
26. See Nuclear Tests: European Parliament Expresses Its Wrath Against France,
EUROPEAN REPORT, Sept. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8359349.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 8 903 cmt. a (1986).
28. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 1 reads, 'The jurisdiction of the Court com-
prises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."
29. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 36, para. 2 provides, in part, 'The states.. may at
any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree-
ment.. .the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: the interpretation of
a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the repa-
ration to be made for the breach of an international obligation."
30. See supra note 27, cmt. b. The requirement of "reciprocity" allows a defendant
state to invoke an exclusion or reservation that exists in the plaintiff state's declaration
but not in its own declaration.
31. See Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the International
Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1857, 1870 (1996).
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the earlier case. 32 The consensus among legal commentators was that
New Zealand faced a difficult legal task in its attempt to use the un-
usual paragraph 63 provision to provide a jurisdictional basis for the
Court 33
, Since there was no precedent for reopening a case in the way that
New Zealand was attempting, New Zealand had to choose its method of
proceeding very carefully. 34 New Zealand did not want to use the tradi-
tional Application, as provided for in the Statute35 and Rules 36 of the
Court, to initiate the case since this would suggest that New Zealand
was attempting to open new proceedings. 37 Other options provided for
in the Statute, including seeking an interpretation 38 or a revision 39 of
the Judgment, were not available since these procedures would be time-
barred4 0
New Zealand asserted that France's announcement that it would
conduct new underground nuclear tests triggered the provisions of
paragraph 63 of the Court's judgment described above.41 New Zealand
also asserted that the proposed underground nuclear tests affected the
"basis" of the Court's 1974 judgment. 42 New Zealand carefully framed
the "basis" of the judgment as not being limited to atmospheric nuclear
testing, 43 even though the 1974 Court had specifically referred to at-
mospheric testing in its decision. 44 New Zealand argued that its origi-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 40, para. 1 which provides, "Cases are brought
before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or
by a written application..."
36. See STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 35, para. 2 which states, "When a case is brought
before the Court by means of an application, the application must, as laid down in Article
40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, indicate the party making it, the party against whom the
claim is brought and the subject of the dispute."
37. See MacKay, supra note 31, at 1871.
38. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 60 provides that all judgments are "[flinal and with-
out appeal." However, a state may request an interpretation of the judgment "[iln the
event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment."
39. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 60, para. 1 states that "[an application for revision
of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such
a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, un-
known to the Court and also to the party claiming revision .... "
40. See MacKay, supra note 31, at 1871. Art. 61(5) mandates that "[nlo application
for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment."
41. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 289 (Sept. 22).
42. Id. at 289-90.
43. Id.
44. The Court stated in paragraph 29 of its Judgment, "The Court therefore considers
that, for purposes of this Application, the New Zealand claim is to be interpreted as ap-
plying only to atmospheric tests, not to any other form of testing, and as applying only to
atmospheric tests so conducted as to give rise to radio-active fall-out on New Zealand's
territory." Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 466 (Dec. 20).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
nal application did not refer only to atmospheric testing but to any nu-
clear testing affecting the environment and that the Court "matched"
New Zealand's concern with France's current form of testing. 45 New
Zealand continued its argument by asserting that the Court would not
have matched New Zealand's concern solely to atmospheric testing if
the Court had known in 1974 that underground nuclear testing would
not remove the risks of contamination. 46 Therefore, New Zealand ar-
gued that the "basis" of the 1974 judgment, limiting it to atmospheric
testing, had been altered and that it was entitled to a "resumption of
the proceedings."47
On September 8, 1995, the Court announced that it would hold
hearings only on the "threshold" issue of whether New Zealand's pro-
ceedings fell within the provisions of paragraph 63 of the 1974 Judg-
ment. After consideration of this question, the Court announced its Or-
der of September 22, 1995, that New Zealand's request did not fall
within paragraph 63 and consequently New Zealand's claims would be
dismissed. 48
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the question before
it as requiring the consideration of two independent questions: first,
what types of procedures were envisaged by the Court pursuant to
paragraph 63; and, second, whether the "basis" of the 1974 judgment
had been "affected" within the meaning of paragraph 63.49 On the first
question, the Court concluded that the inclusion of paragraph 63's op-
tion for a "request for examination of the situation" could not have been
intended to limit New Zealand to procedures that would otherwise nor-
mally be available 5° , and that a "special procedure" is available to New
Zealand if the second question is answered in the affirmative.51 Pro-
ceeding to the second question, the Court concluded that the 1974
Judgment "dealt exclusively with atmospheric nuclear tests" 52 and since
the current situation involves underground nuclear tests, the basis of
the judgment had not been affected as required by paragraph 63.5 By
dismissing the case for this reason, the Court avoided addressing any of
New Zealand's substantive claims under international law. 54
45. 1995 I.C.J. 288, at 290.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 307.
49. Id. at 302.
50. These other procedures include the option to file a new application (Art. 40 of the
I.C.J. statute), request an interpretation (Art. 60), or request a revision (Art. 61). See su-
pra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
51. 1995 I.C.J. 288, at 303-304.
52. Id. at 306.
53. Id.
54. Specifically, the Court noted it "[clannot, therefore, take account of the arguments
derived by New Zealand... [including] the development of international law in recent dec-
750 VOL. 26:4
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Although the Court did not reach the merits of New Zealand's
claims, the Court was careful to explain that the decision is "without
prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural
environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have
in the present instance reaffirmed their commitment."55 The Judge's
individual opinions in the case contain insightful comments on the
proper role of the Court and the development of international environ-
mental law.
Interestingly, a short, separate opinion from the "Member of the
Court from the only country which has suffered the devastating effects
of nuclear weapons. . ." supported the Court's decision to dismiss New
Zealand's claim. 56
Judge Shahabuddeen, writing separately for the Court, noted the
development of the protection of the natural environment in contempo-
rary international law. 57 However, Judge Shahabuddeen found it par-
ticularly salient that New Zealand was requesting substantive relief for
a "new situation" and "new acts."5 8 Judge Shahabuddeen concluded
that paragraph 63 was not intended to cover "fresh matters" and that
there is no "principle of law which entitles the Court to exercise a ter-
minated jurisdiction over fresh acts occurring after the termina-
tion. . .. "59
Judges Weeramantry, Koroma, and Judge ad hoc Sir Geoffrey
Palmer each filed a strong dissenting opinion. Judge Weeramantry be-
gan by stating his agreement with the Court's conclusion that para-
graph 63 was intended to provide New Zealand with a special procedure
not otherwise available. 60 A review of New Zealand's original 1973
complaint showed that there was no explicit reference to atmospheric
nuclear testing, but only a complaint of various types of damage from
radioactive fallout. 61 Most importantly, Judge Weeramantry asserted
that New Zealand's complaint of a violation of international law was
grounded in the fact of the injury - the damage from radioactive con-
tamination - not the specific cause of the injury. 62 This point is empha-
sized by noting that it would be illogical to believe that New Zealand
would be content to endure damage from radioactive contamination as
ades." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 310 (Judge Oda). While supporting the dismissal of New Zealand's claim,
Judge Oda concluded by expressing "[mly personal hope that no further tests of any kind
of nuclear weapons will be carried out under any circumstances in the future." Id.
57. Id. at 312.
58. Id. at 315.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 320-21.
61. Id. at 325-26.
62. Id. at 327.
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long as it was not due to atmospheric nuclear testing. 63
Judge Weeramantry continued by pointing out that the state of the
knowledge in 1974 indicated that underground nuclear tests were safe
and therefore that New Zealand's objections to atmospheric nuclear
testing were founded on the belief that they were the only form of un-
safe testing.64 Therefore, New Zealand's claims were actually directed
at unsafe nuclear testing and present knowledge indicates that under-
ground nuclear tests are unsafe in the same ways that atmospheric
tests are unsafe. 65 Judge Weeramantry therefore concluded that the
basis of the 1974 judgment was that harm must not be caused by nu-
clear tests and that New Zealand was entitled to not be exposed to any
radioactive contamination from nuclear tests. 66
Judge Weeramantry noted that New Zealand must make out a
prima facie case that the dangers that were present in 1973 were pres-
ent again in 1995 in order to activate the procedures of the Court.67 In
analyzing this question, Judge Weeramantry proposed two possibilities
for the placement of the burden of proof: (1) to place the burden
squarely on New Zealand and determine whether a prima facie case has
been made out based on the dangers that New Zealand has complained
of; or (2) to use the principles of environmental law and place the bur-
den on France to prove that it will not produce the damage that New
Zealand has alleged. 68 After a complex analysis of the evidence pre-
sented before the Court, Judge Weeramantry concluded that New Zea-
land had made out a strong prima facie case and had succeeded in
showing that the dangers complained of fell within the provisions of
paragraph 63.69
Judge Weeramantry discussed the importance of the principle of
intergenerational equity as a rapidly developing principle of environ-
mental law. 70 Intergenerational equity is a concept of international law
that places a responsibility on countries to "protect and improve the en-
vironment for present and future generations."71 In order to promote
intergenerational equity, the focus must be on preventing damage from
occurring. 72  Although a State has sovereignty over its territory,
intergenerational equity limits the exercise of this sovereignty to the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 328-29.
65. Id. at 330.
66. Id. at 332.
67. Id. at 347.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id. at 358.
70. Id. at 341.
71. Id. at 342 quoting The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, prin-
ciple 1, June 16, 1972.
72. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 84 (1989).
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use and benefit of the resources in its territory only when that use does
not destroy the resources for future generations.7 3 The Court must con-
sider France's responsibility to future generations when it considers
whether New Zealand has made out a prima facie case.7 4
The Judge noted how the precautionary principle allows New Zea-
land to bring this case before France has conducted the nuclear tests.75
The precautionary principle provides that "[wihere there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation."76 This principle has now been expressed in at
least seven international treaties and there exists sufficient state prac-
tice to conclude that it has gained broad acceptance on the international
level. 77 In this case, New Zealand provided materials that indicate
there is a serious threat of irreversible damage from the proposed un-
derground nuclear tests and therefore the Court should postpone the
tests until a complete evaluation can be completed. 78 A corollary to the
precautionary principle is the requirement of an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) before a state undertakes any activity that "is likely
to significantly affect the environment."79 The Noumea Convention8 0
contains an explicit obligation to conduct an EIA before beginning any
project which might affect the marine environmentS1
The fundamental principle of modern environmental law that no
nation is entitled by its own activities to cause damage to the environ-
ment of any other nation also supports New Zealand's claim against
France. Judge Weeramantry described this principle as "well en-
trenched in international law."8 2 The origins of this principle can be
73. Id. at 290.
74. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 342 (Sept. 22).
75. Id.
76. Id. quoting Bergen ECE Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development,
May 15, 1990, in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 558-59
(Harald Hohmann ed., 1992).
77. See Phillipe Sands, The "Greening"of International Law: Emerging Principles and
Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 299-302 (1994).
78. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 344 quoting UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP)
GUIDELINES 187 (1987).
80. Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environ-
ment in the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987) [hereinafter Noumea
Convention].
81. Art. 16(2) of the Noumea Convention provides, "Each party shall, within its capa-
bilities, assess the potential effects of such projects on the marine environment. Id. at
art. 16, 26 I.L.M. at 48 (emphasis added).
82. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 346 (Sept. 22). In its later Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42
(July 8), the Court stated, '"The existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
1998
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traced to the Trail Smelter Case83 and it is currently embodied in sev-
eral international instruments.8 4 It is also codified in Section 601 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.85
Weeramantry concluded by stating that New Zealand had made out
a strong prima facie case and that their claims should be given full con-
sideration by the Court since, when two conclusions are possible, the
Court should choose the one that does not shut out enquiry.8 6 He ex-
pressed regret that "the Court has not availed itself of the opportunity
to enquire more fully into this matter and of making a contribution to
some of the seminal principles of the evolving corpus of international
environmental law."87
Judge Koroma's dissent focused on the proper standard that he be-
lieves the Court should have used to determine whether New Zealand
had established the legal basis for its Request.88 Judge Koroma be-
lieved New Zealand made out a prima facie case and that the Court
should have reached New Zealand's substantive claims.89 A close ex-
amination of paragraph 63 in its context revealed that the Court in
1974 believed that ending atmospheric testing would end any possible
radioactive contamination of the environment and that formed the basis
of the judgment.90 Judge Koroma indicated that the importance of the
claims presented by the case should cause the Court to resolve any close
questions in favor of the state alleging that the basis of the judgement
had been affected. 91
Koroma noted that there is probably a duty under contemporary in-
ternational law "not to cause gross or serious damage which can rea-
sonably be avoided, together with a duty not to permit the escape of
dangerous substances."92 He pointed to several international treaties
environment."
83. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
84. See, e.g., Rio Declaration of the Environment, principle 2 (1992); Noumea Conven-
tion, art. 4(6) (1987); Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, principle 21
(1972).
85. Section 601(1)(b) provides that a state is required to take necessary measures to
"ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control are conducted so as not to cause
significant injury to the environment..."
86. 1995 I.C.J. at 362. Here, Judge Weeramanty differs fundamentally from the ma-
jority opinion that "[w]hile judicial settlement may provide a path to international har-
mony in circumstances of conflict, it is none the less true that the needless continuance of
litigation is an obstacle to such harmony." Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457,
477 (Dec. 20).
87. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 362.
88. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 373.
89. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. at 379.
90. Id. at 377-78.
91. Id. at 376.
92. Id. at 378.
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that contain this principle as indicative of a "trend" towards "prohibit-
ing nuclear testing with radioactive effect."93 In Judge Koroma's opin-
ion, the existence of this trend, combined with the evidence of the risk
of radioactive contamination from the French tests, should have caused
the Court to impose interim protective measures as a prelude to pro-
ceeding to a full examination of the situation. 94
Judge Palmer's dissenting opinion also noted that New Zealand
had made out a prima facie case for an examination of the situation in
accordance with paragraph 63.95 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Palmer suggested that a risk-benefit analysis should be performed, and,
when applied to the facts of this case, a risk-benefit analysis shows
clearly that a prima facie case has been established.96 He compared
this analysis to a law of torts calculation and noted that the Interna-
tional Law Commission had recently supported this type of test under
the section of its draft Articles titled "risk of causing significant trans-
boundary harm."97 Judge Palmer reviewed the development of interna-
tional environmental law between 1973 and the date of the decision by
first noting that the original 1973 case was commenced shortly after the
international meeting at Stockholm which produced the Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment.98 There has been an explosion of international environmental
agreements in recent years and there currently exist more than a hun-
dred multilateral environmental instruments. 99 Judge Palmer noted
two of the most important developments in international environmental
law have been the development of the precautionary principle and the
environmental impact assessment. 100 Interestingly, there is a corre-
sponding lack of judgments in the area of international environmental
law. 10 1 Judge Palmer advanced his belief that the Court should look to
the current state of the applicable law at the date the Court is called on
to apply it when considering this type of case. 10 2 This is an important
point since international environmental law has been developing very
93. Id. at 378-79.
94. Id. at 379.
95. Id. at 405.
96. Id. at 404-05.
97. Id. at 405. The International Law Commission defined this expression as "the
combined effect of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the magnitude of its
injurious impact." Id. (quoting Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of its Forty-Sixth Session, May 2- July 22, 1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
400, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994)).
98. Id. at 405.
99. Id. at 407.
100. Id. Judge Palmer pointed to the Rio Declaration of 1992 as the primary instru-
ment that "refined, advanced, sharpened, and developed some of the principles adopted at
Stockholm." Id.
101. Id. at 408.
102. Id. at 413.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
recently and very rapidly and there was a much more limited body of
law to draw upon when the original nuclear tests case was plead in the
mid-1970s. Judge Palmer concluded with his perspective on the proper
role of the ICJ in the world today by first criticizing the "formalistic"
approach taken by the majority of the Court.1 03 He summarized the
majority opinion with his statement that "[tihe law appears as some
disembodied construct that is far removed from the concerns of the real
world." 104 Judge Palmer continued his stinging attack on the majority
by concluding that he "find[s] such an approach to legal reasoning arid
and intellectually unsatisfying."10 5 Finally, Judge Palmer declared that
"[t]he Court has a responsibility to declare, develop and uphold interna-
tional law."10 6
PART THREE
The contrast between the majority opinion and the dissenting
opinions is striking and revealing. The New Zealand v. France nuclear
tests case illustrates a crucial divergence among the Court members on
the proper role of the Court in the development of international law.
The majority opinion, even though it failed to reach New Zealand's sub-
stantive claims, can not be criticized as incomplete in its legal analysis.
Indeed, the twenty-page Court opinion illustrates a very thorough
analysis of the pleadings presented and demonstrates the Court's care-
ful consideration of the technical jurisdictional issue presented. How-
ever, the Court's conclusion on the jurisdictional issue resulted in the
disappointing decision to dismiss New Zealand's claims without reach-
ing their substance. In dismissing New Zealand's claims, the Court
missed a golden opportunity to advance the development of interna-
tional law.
The key issue in the Court's decision, whether the "basis" of the
Court's 1974 Judgment had been affected, could have been decided in
favor of New Zealand without compromising the integrity of the Court
and the requirement for jurisdiction. New Zealand, admittedly, was at-
tempting to use a novel approach to gain jurisdiction. However, the
Court recognized the necessity to allow New Zealand to use such a
novel procedure to return to the Court when it included paragraph 63 in
its 1974 Judgment. Paragraph 63 was written in very general terms
and included no mention of atmospheric testing.107 The Court admitted
that New Zealand's application did not specify atmospheric nuclear
testing but simply referred to nuclear tests that "give rise to radioactive
103. Id.
104. Id. at 414.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 417.
107. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 477 (Dec. 20).
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fall-out. 10s To make the leap to limit the application to atmospheric
tests, the Court relied on the fact that New Zealand had argued its case
"mainly in relation to atmospheric tests."109  However, as Judge
Weeramantry correctly pointed out, it is illogical to believe New Zea-
land would have limited its application to atmospheric testing if France
had also been conducting or considering underground nuclear testing.
Considering the fact that underground nuclear testing was not being
conducted at the time and there was insufficient evidence to determine
if such testing would cause radioactive contamination, it was extraordi-
nary for the Court to penalize New Zealand twenty-one years later for
failing to argue an irrelevant issue. However, the Court did exactly
that when it decided to stand-by the proposition that the "basis" of the
1974 Judgment was solely atmospheric nuclear testing.
This result is disheartening to proponents of the increased influ-
ence of the rule of international law in relations among States. At the
very least, the Court could reasonably have found the provisions of
paragraph 63 triggered by New Zealand's request so that the important
legal issues raised could have been given a full consideration and
treatment. The Charter of the ICJ defines the Court's function as de-
ciding "in accordance with international law" the disputes that are
submitted to it.110 In describing this function, the Charter requires the
Court to consider international conventions, international custom, and
general principles of law."' By reaching an unnecessary conclusion
limiting the scope of its earlier decision, the Court effectively failed to
undertake a consideration on the merits in accordance with interna-
tional law and its duty under the Charter.
The process of deciding a case on the merits allows and encourages
further development of international law and further respect for the
role of international law in the often-anarchical world of international
relations. The Court has refused to run from sensitive issues in the
past '1 2 and it is perplexing and disappointing to see it do so in this
judgment. As Judge Shahabuddeen noted, the Court in the past has
"found opportunity for enterprise and even occasional boldness. Espe-
cially where there is doubt, its forward course is helpfully illuminated
by broad notions of justice.""l 3 Hopefully, the future will bring an In-
ternational Court of Justice with a greater incentive to continue its
"forward course" and develop and strengthen the role of international
108. Id. at 466.
109. Id.
110. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.
111. STATUTE OF THE COURT, art. 38, para. 1.
112. As evidenced by the Court's willingness in the past to consider the politically
charged issues of, among other things, the legality of nuclear weapons and the U.S. sup-
port of rebel forces in Nicaragua.
113. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 316 (Sept. 22).
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law in the world today.
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